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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes an explanation of sex-differences in job-allocation and pay. Job-
allocation calculations are considered to be related to 1) the distribution of housework 
and 2) the skill-specialization requirements of jobs. Both elements combined generate a 
particular incentive structure for each sex. Welfare policies and services can, however, 
lower the risks of skill-depreciation for women as well as increase their intra-household 
bargaining power, hence reducing the economic pay-offs of “traditional” sphere-
specialization by sex. The implications of this model for earnings are tested using data 
from the second round of the European Social Survey. Results seem consistent with the 
model predictions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The allocation of men and women into different jobs plays an absolutely central role in 
explaining sex-differences in pay. The sex-composition of occupations appears as one 
of the largest contributors to the gender wage gap in empirical models. Moreover, the 
more occupations are disaggregated into finer categories - i.e. the more occupational 
measures approach actual jobs - the larger this contribution seems to be (see e.g., Blau 
and Khan 2000; Boraas and Rodgers 2003; Meyersson-Milgrom et al. 2001; Petersen et 
al. 1997). Opening up the black-box of the gender wage gap thus requires our focusing 
on the central association between employees’ sex, the jobs they occupy and their 
earnings.  
 
Many sociological and economic factors are surely involved in the processes linking 
individuals to jobs and jobs to rewards (see Polavieja 2008). In this paper I will not 
review all these possible factors at length but propose instead a simple theoretical model 
that focuses on incentive structures and assumes common rationality across the sexes. In 
so doing, the model seeks theoretical efficiency in the belief that efficient models can 
better unearth the structural nature of gender inequalities - i.e., the inequality component 
that does not depend on differences in actors’ attitudes but on the very structure of 
economic incentives. 
  
In line with an abundant literature in both economics and sociology, individuals’ 
decisions regarding job-allocation are considered to be related to two crucial factors: 1) 
the existing amount and the distribution of household tasks - both at the individual and 
the societal levels; and 2) the structural properties of jobs - in particular, their skill-
investment requirements. The former factor imposes different risks/opportunities to men 
and women, whilst the latter defines the tenure-earning profiles associated with each 
job-choice and hence the expected returns of the potential job match. The combination 
of 1 and 2 results in a different opportunity structure for each sex.  
 
Such opportunity structures are expected to be affected by the institutional context. 
Welfare policies and services can reduce the risks of skill-depreciation for both women 
and their employers (see e.g., Estebez-Abe 2005), whilst increasing women’s intra-
household bargaining power (see e.g., Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Fuwa 2004). Both 
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effects combined should diminish the economic pay-offs of “traditional” sphere-
specialization by sex and lead to more equal labour market outcomes between men and 
women.  
 
This model is tested using a sub-sample of married and cohabiting individuals drawn 
from the second round of the European Social Survey (ESS) carried out in 2004. The 
ESS module on Family, Work and Welfare offers an unusually wide range of 
theoretically-relevant indicators that are hardly ever present simultaneously in a cross-
national survey. This provides us with a privileged analytical standpoint in order to 
unpack the empirical association between occupational sex-composition and earnings. 
By restricting the analysis to married or cohabiting employees, empirical tests focus on 
the connections between the division of housework within families, job-specialization 
and individual earnings. The use of unusually rich controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity, including very-rarely measured personality traits and sex-role attitudes, 
allow us to interpret the statistical findings as reflecting incentive structures not linked 
to attitudinal differences by sex. 
 
The paper is divided into 5 sections including this introduction. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model and derives various empirical hypotheses from it; section 3 explains 
the data, the variables and the methodology used to test them; empirical findings are 
discussed in section 4; and, finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
Individuals consider the expected costs and benefits of their job matching decisions 
both at the supply and at the demand-side of the labour market. Such decisions have, in 
turn, crucial earning consequences over time. Jobs therefore play a central role in this 
model. 
 
In line with the economic literature on training in imperfect markets, investments in all 
types of skills acquired on the job, including general skills, are regarded as involving 
costs and benefits for both firms and employees1 (see e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; 
1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998). Acquiring job-specific skills entails costs for 
employees because learning requires effort - and effort is a limited resource. Skill-
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acquisition on the job is also costly for firms, as employees’ learning takes, at the very 
least, time (which amounts to employees’ forgone productivity) and, in most cases, 
involves actual training investments on the employer’s side. These investments can be 
considerable for some jobs. 
 
Various economic and sociological theories explain why job-specific investments made 
by firms should lead to the closure of the employment relationship to outside 
competition (see e.g., Goldthorpe 2000: ch. 10; Lazear 1995: ch. 4; Sorensen 1994; 
Williamson 1985: ch. 10). Put simply, employers will insure their investments in 
workers’ job-specific training by generating incentives for employees to stay in the firm 
after such training-investments have been made2. Long-term employment contracts are 
an obvious tool to this end. Yet closing the employment relation might create 
disincentives for workers to put forth productive effort. Employers thus face the 
question of how to ensure that workers protected from market competition do not shirk. 
There are various solutions to this problem - discussed for example by Lazear (1995: ch. 
4) and Sorensen (1994) - but the one typically stressed in the sociological literature is 
the use of upward-sloping tenure-earning profiles (see e.g., Breen 1997; Goldthorpe 
2000: ch. 10; Sorensen 2000). By linking rewards to tenure employers shift the returns 
to employees’ job-specific investments to the end of their employment careers. The 
typical incentive-compatible compensation profile will thus be one where workers are 
paid less than they are worth at low levels of tenure but more than they are worth as 
they accumulate seniority (Lazear 1995: 239-42). Such system will promote both 
employees’ durability in the firm as well as their sustained effort over time. Tilted 
compensation acts therefore as an incentive device in employment relations that have 
been closed by job-specific skill investments. 
 
There are jobs that do not require such skill investments as they entail very little 
requirements in terms of job-specific training. Hence there is no economic reason that 
these jobs provide their incumbents with steep tenure-earning profiles. For simplicity, 
we can therefore assume only two types of jobs: high specific-skilled jobs (H) and low 
specific-skilled jobs (L) for individuals with the same schooling levels. The expected 
returns per unit of effort (e) for these two types of jobs are represented graphically in 
figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Compensation profiles per effort over tenure for high-specialization (H) and 
low-specialization (L) jobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A central idea in this model is that returns per effort will be lower at the early stages of 
the employment contract in job H than in job L3. Yet as workers accumulate tenure, 
returns over effort increase very notably in the former but remain very much unchanged 
in the latter. L-type jobs are therefore “easy” jobs to perform for every level of 
schooling required but, in turn, they offer lower returns over time. Lack of job-specific 
requirements will allow workers to move from different L-type jobs at virtually no costs 
(apart from those involved in job-seeking) and employers to substitute incumbents 
without losing job-specific training investments. Job separations will therefore be more 
frequent in L-type jobs than in H-type ones, as they are less costly for both employers 
and employees. This distinction between high and low skill-specificity jobs is crucial 
for explaining sex-differences in allocation choices both at the demand and the supply 
sides. 
 
 Wages/effort 
Job H 
Job L 
  Tenure 
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Micro-level implications 
 
In a context of imperfect information, employers can discriminate against women for H-
type jobs if they consider the risk of job-disruption to be higher for women than for men 
of the same characteristics. That women are considered as having higher average risks 
of job-disruption is a statistically-informed perception based on the existing distribution 
of family responsibilities and household tasks between the sexes in all advanced 
societies. Taking such distribution as the basis for calculating sex-specific disruption 
risks is a form of what could be termed distributional inference. 
 
Women are likely to consider the same distributional facts with respect to household 
and family tasks as an element informing their own job-allocation choices. Domestic 
workload is expected to constrain women’s investment choices in at least two crucial 
ways: First, by reducing the amount of effort at their disposal - as household tasks lead 
to energy depletion making job-specific investments a more costly option for women4 
(see e.g., Hersch 1991, Hersch and Stratton 1997; Stratton 2001); and, secondly, by 
increasing the risks of an eventual job disruption due to family demands. Any rational 
actor anticipating job separations will be less inclined to incur job-investment costs that 
can only be recouped in the future as long as the employment relationship is maintained. 
Similarly, any rational actor putting (or expecting to put) forth high levels of effort in 
household tasks, will take such effort-allocation fact (or expectation) into consideration 
when making her job-investment choices. Hence the risks associated with women 
choosing job H over job L are expected to be perceived as higher, not only by 
employers, but crucially by women themselves. 
 
Feed-back effects 
 
Sex-differences in labour-market returns can themselves be taken as relevant 
information by rational actors in imperfectly informative contexts. Under this light, the 
under-representation of women in high-paying jobs matters because it sends signals to 
other women that such job-allocation option might be risky - even if such distribution 
conveys no real information about each individual’s actual probability of success. By 
sending different signals to men and women, an unequal distribution of labour-market 
rewards across the sexes can lead to the reinforcement of traditional strategies of sphere 
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specialization. One does not need to endorse specialization arguments a la Becker5 
(1981; 1985) to accept that a feed-back between a “traditional” allocation of family 
roles/tasks and sex-differences in pay is likely to occur. Such reinforcing effect follows 
logically from the very principle of what has been termed above distributional 
inference, by which I mean the idea that macro-level distributions affect individuals’ 
belief formation. This idea is absolutely central to all mechanism-based explanations in 
sociology (see e.g., Hedström and Swedberg 1998).  
 
Institutions 
 
Welfare institutions can, however, reduce the risks for women to invest in highly-
specific jobs, as well as the risks for their potential employers to employ them. Extensive 
public childcare provision is particularly important as it reduces time off work for 
women, which increases their opportunities for job-specific investments, whilst reducing 
employers’ retraining costs (see Estebez-Abe 2005). The role played by parental-leave 
policies is certainly more contentious. Generous maternity-leave policies can safeguard 
women’s employment but they also increase time off work hence augmenting the risks 
of deskilling for mothers. This latter policy effect can discourage employers’ 
investments in women. Parental-leave policies could thus lead to a reinforcement of sex-
differences in job-specific investments.  
 
Public childcare policies seem, therefore, a much better tool for sex-equalization in the 
labour market than parental leave. Indeed public childcare provision has been typically 
considered an indicator of the degree of defamilialization in a given society - i.e., the 
extent to which women are freed from the burden of family obligations (see e.g., Esping-
Andersen 1999; Lister 1994; Lewis 1992; O’connor 1993; Orloff 1993). Yet it should be 
equally noted that high levels of decommodification - i.e., public services and transfers 
that protect individuals from the risks associated with labour market failure - will also 
benefit women’s investments in jobs by providing a generous safety net in the event of 
job disruption - i.e., by reducing the costs of failure.  
 
The institutional configurations that promote women’s position in the labour market can 
also have important consequences within households. If the position of women in the 
labour market is strengthened, their intra-household bargaining power should increase 
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accordingly and this, in turn, should lead to a more equal distribution of domestic tasks 
(see e.g., Bittman et al. 2003; Ermisch 2003, ch. 2; Evertsson and Nermo, 2004). This 
expectation follows from both sociological and economic bargaining models, which see 
the unequal distribution of domestic work as the result of spouses’ relative access to 
resources. Welfare policies could also increase women’s bargaining power directly by 
increasing their chances of living independently, hence making their threat of 
marital/partnership dissolution more credible6.  
 
A more equal distribution of housework should change, in turn, the informational 
structure and reduce the perceived risks of investing in job-specific skills for both 
women and for their employers. It thus follows that defamilialization and 
decommodification institutions can reduce the pay-offs of a traditional division of labour 
within couples and promote greater levels of both housework and labour market equality 
between the sexes. Under particular institutional conditions, the traditional work-family 
nexus could thus be progressively replaced by more pro-egalitarian dynamics. 
 
Welfare types 
 
Institutional conditions particularly conducive to the erosion of the traditional sex-
specialization model could be found in Scandinavian societies. The social-democratic 
welfare state prevailing in these societies is known to provide the highest levels of both 
defamilialization and decommodification in the world. This is a welfare state fully 
committed to the promotion of women’s economic independence from the family. This 
goal has been pursued over time via the provision of universal benefits and services, 
which are independent from household resources, and which encourage women’s full 
participation in the labour market. A particularly important welfare service to this end is 
the very generous network of public childcare provision available in these societies7.  
 
Communist regimes were also characterized by a strong commitment to the full 
integration of women in the economic sphere as well as by providing generous public 
childcare facilities to this end. Although many of these institutional features collapsed 
after regime change (see Hantrais 2004), the defamilialization legacy of past communist 
rule could still be visible today in the post-communist societies of Eastern and Central 
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Europe, as almost two thirds of the workforces of these societies surveyed in 2004 had 
entered employment prior to 1989 (see Polavieja 2007).  
 
In contrast to the social-democratic model and to the defamilializing elements of the 
communist regimes, both the conservative and the liberal welfare states have shown 
little commitment to women’s independence from the family. In the conservative model 
the family, and not the individual, is considered the main locus of solidarity and welfare 
provision is organized accordingly. This obviously reinforces the traditional family 
model leading to sphere-specialization by sex. The liberal model has, for its part, a much 
more subsidiary take on welfare intervention, which is largely restricted to cases of 
market failure and demonstrable need. This also leaves little room for concerns about 
defamilialization, which has never been a goal of liberal regimes. As a result, the liberal 
model, with its laissez-faire approach, exerts little institutional impact on the incentive 
structures leading to sex-differences in allocation and rewards.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
The model outlined above allows us to formulate the following hypotheses regarding 
sex-differences in allocation and pay:  
 
H1: If different job-investment risks are behind the observed differences in job-
allocation by sex, and if such differences are key to understanding differences in pay, 
then the introduction of indicators of job-specialization in the wage equations should 
absorb a substantial part of the effect of occupational sex-composition on earnings. 
 
H2: The greater the supply of housework of a given individual, the lower his/her 
earnings should be. This is expected because: 1) domestic workload increases the costs 
of job-specialization via energy depletion and higher (actual or perceived) disruption 
risks and 2) because greater domestic effort implies lower performance (via energy 
depletion) in all jobs.  
 
H3: Yet a high-paying job should also increase intra-household bargaining power and 
allow individuals to negotiate lower levels of domestic input at their homes, from which 
a negative correlation between housework and earnings should also follow.  
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Note that H2 and H3 cannot be differentiated empirically in a cross-sectional framework, 
as it is not possible to separate out the earning consequences of domestic work (H2) 
from the bargaining effects of high earnings (H3) if time is fixed. All we can expect to 
observe is a negative and significant association between housework and earnings. This 
expectation can be tested using the ESS. We can refer to it as the housework association 
hypothesis (H2/3).  
 
H4: If sex-specific incentive structures exist independently of attitudinal heterogeneity, 
the expected statistical associations between the variables in focus - job-specialization, 
housework and earnings- should remain significant even after controlling for possible 
sex-differences in preferences, attitudes and tastes.  
 
H5: Welfare regimes providing high levels of defamilialization and decommodification 
should reduce the pay-offs of sphere specialization by sex, thus making women’s returns 
less dependent on their own domestic supply. This is because defamilialization and 
decommodification should lower the costs of job-allocation at every level of domestic 
supply. On the other hand, welfare institutions can also increase women’s intra-
household bargaining power at every level of earnings by increasing their options 
outside partnership (i.e., their threat points). Note finally that women’s greater 
bargaining power should translate into a more egalitarian and hence more compressed 
distribution of housework amongst spouses in generous welfare states8. A more 
compressed distribution can also reduce by itself the statistical association between 
housework and earnings. So each and all of these effects should lead to a weaker 
statistical association between housework and earnings in social-democratic and 
(possibly also in post-communist) regimes.  
 
 DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
  
I use the second round (2004) of the European Social Survey (ESS) to fit different 
earning functions to a sub-sample of married and cohabiting employees. An important 
methodological caveat of the ESS is that country samples are small for the purposes of 
earnings research. Moreover, response rates to the earnings questions are below the 50 
per cent threshold in several countries. Such countries have been excluded from the 
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analysis. The final working sample includes all married or cohabiting employed wage-
earners (reporting wages) older than 24 and country nationals from Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom (N=5,794). Small sample-size forces us to pool 
men and women together and to test institutional effects via welfare typology 
interactions. These are all methodological limitations that stem from the structure of the 
data. 
 
The dependent variable of our analyses is the logarithm of gross hourly wages in Euros 
before deduction for tax and/or insurance. According to the ESS, the overall mean gross-
pay for the selected sample is 17€ per hour. There are obvious differences by country. 
 
Occupational sex-composition is calculated as the fraction of employees that are women 
in respondents’ occupation at respondents’ country. Sex-composition is measured using 
the unrestricted national samples of our selected ESS countries, each containing an 
average of 1,600 observations. The ESS includes occupational information at 4 digits. 
Yet in order to increase the number of observations per occupational cell, and hence to 
obtain more reliable sex-concentration estimates, 4-digit occupational codes have been 
clustered into 3-digits9. Occupational segregation measured at 3 digits seems pervasive 
in the analyzed countries. According to the ESS, 43 per cent of all employed male 
respondents work in male-dominated occupations at their countries - i.e., occupations 
where at least ¾ of the incumbents are men - whilst 37 per cent of women work in 
female-dominated occupations - where men account for less than ¼ of the incumbents.  
 
Job-specialization is measured using respondents’ own assessments of job-learning time. 
The ESS asks every worker to evaluate the time that it would be required for “someone” 
with the right qualification to learn to do respondent’s job well. As discussed in 
Polavieja (2008:203), this wording avoids self-assessment and makes the direction of 
any possible subjectivity bias depend on the sex-composition of jobs. This is because 
respondents will most probably think of that “someone” as a woman if they are 
employed in female-dominated jobs and as a man if they are employed in male-
dominated ones. If biased women consider men more capable than themselves, which is 
the expected direction of subjective bias according to the literature (see e.g., Corell 
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2001), this wording should make them likely to report longer learning periods than 
actually required in the former case but shorter learning periods in the latter. Hence it is 
expected that any possible gender-driven self-confidence bias acts in the direction of 
reducing the capacity of JSK to absorb the association between sex-composition and 
earnings10. Respondents’ assessments of job-learning time are measured at the ESS using 
an interval scale that ranges from 1 (less than a week) to 8 (more than 2 years)11.  
 
Housework supply is measured using two rather distinct, although evidently correlated, 
indicators: 1) individual’s total supply of housework and 2) individual’s supply relative 
to that of his/her partner. Individual supply is measured using information on the total 
amount of housework time supplied at respondents’ homes, as well as on respondents’ 
own contribution to this total. The ESS defines total housework as the number of hours 
devoted in a typical weekday by all members of the household to domestic tasks such as 
cooking, washing, cleaning, shopping, property maintenance and the like, not including 
childcare nor leisure activities. Respondent’s own share of this total has been computed 
on the basis of their responses to the ESS question “about how much of this (total 
household) time do you spend yourself?” assuming the following equivalences (imputed 
values in parenthesis): 1. None or almost none (0); 2. Up to a quarter of the time (0.2); 3. 
More than a quarter, up to a half of the time (0.4); 4. More than a half, up to three 
quarters of the time (0.6); 5. More than three quarters, less than all of the time (0.8); and 
6. All or nearly all of the time (1). Total individual housework is calculated as total 
household time multiplied by respondent’s share (using the imputed equivalences). 
 
The relative contribution of respondents’ vis-à-vis their partners is calculated as the 
difference between respondents’ own share of housework and their partner’s share, 
where both shares are calculated using the same equivalences as above. The resulting 
indicator thus ranges from -1 (i.e., the respondent does not contribute to housework and 
his/her partner does all of it) to 1 (i.e., the respondent does all the housework and his/her 
partner does none). These two housework indicators show a correlation of 0.6 in the 
ESS, which means that the higher the amount of domestic supply provided by 
respondents, the higher is their relative contribution to the total housework vis-à-vis their 
partners. This unsurprising finding implies that these indicators cannot be estimated 
jointly but must be used as alternative measures of housework supply. 
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Institutional interactions are tested using and expanded version of Esping-Andersen’s 
original welfare state typology (Esping-Andersen 1990) including a fourth category that 
comprises the former communist societies of East Central Europe. The analyzed 
countries are therefore clustered in the following 4 regime types: Conservative 
(including respondents from Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Spain and former West 
Germany); Social-Democratic (comprising respondents from Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Finland); Liberal (United Kingdom) and Post-Communist (Czech Republic, 
Poland and former East Germany).  
 
Differences in attitudes, preferences and orientations between men and women are 
expected to have a biasing impact on earnings’ estimations. The wealth of attitudinal 
indicators present at the ESS allows us to identify these attitudinal differences by sex and 
hence to control for a source of individual heterogeneity that is usually unobservable. 
Drawing on several attitudinal questions, two different scales have been constructed. 
 
The first scale measures gender attitudes and has already been used in Polavieja (2008). 
The scale computes respondents’ degree of agreement with the following five Likert-
type items: 1. whether women should be prepared to cut down on their wages for the 
sake of their families, 2. whether men should have equal domestic responsibilities as 
women, 3. whether men should have preference over scarce jobs, 4. whether parents 
should stick together for children even if they do not get along, and 5. whether a person’s 
family should be his/her priority. The scale shows a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.6, it is 
normally distributed and ranges from 0 to 20, the latter value implying the highest score 
in “traditional” gender attitudes. 
 
The second attitudinal control seeks to address differences in what could be termed 
degree of “social ambition”. If, due to different socialization patterns, men are on 
average more ambitious than women12 and, if ambition affects earnings, then controlling 
for this indicator should reduce estimation bias. The indicator used to this end is the 
result of applying factor analysis to a set of attitudinal questions from the so-called 
Human Value module of the ESS. In this module, respondents are presented with several 
descriptions of fictitious individuals and are asked to evaluate how much alike they 
consider themselves to be in relation to the examples described (examples are chosen so 
as to have the same sex as respondents). Factor analysis showed that responses to the 
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following descriptions did actually formed part of a single factor (results available on 
request): 1. Being very successful is important to her/him. She/he hopes people will 
recognize her/his achievements; 2. It is important to her/him to show her/his abilities. 
She/he wants people to admire what she/he does; and 3. It is important to her/him to get 
respect from others. She/he wants people to do what she/he says. Responses to these 
three descriptions were added up in a 6-interval scale ranging from -3 to 2. The scale 
showed a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7. It is admittedly debatable what the most appropriate 
label to describe such scale is, as well as whether one should interpret it as tapping on 
attitudinal differences or on somewhat deeper personality traits13. In any event, what 
seems apparent is that introducing individual scores along this attitudinal dimension in 
the earnings models is an unusual opportunity to control for individual characteristics 
possibly linked to returns and very unlikely to be observed elsewhere. Attitudinal 
controls will allow us to interpret our findings in terms of incentive structures, which is 
absolutely crucial for the validation of the proposed model.  
 
A final control introduced in the earnings function captures the degree of wage 
compression in respondents’ industry, measured as the industry-country standard 
deviation from mean hourly wages. This is an important control as we know that 
Scandinavian societies show greater levels of wage compression than other “regimes”. In 
order to test for the welfare-state effect discussed above (H5), it is therefore important to 
net out our regime-type interactions from the possible statistical effects of different wage 
distributions14 (see Mandel and Semyonov 2005). 
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Table 1. Description of key variables. Married or cohabiting employed respondents from 
selected countries 
Variable Description N Mean 
or % 
Standard 
deviation 
y Is the log of the ratio of gross weakly earnings and 
usually weekly hours in € (1)  6,090 2.36 1.0 
schooling Years of schooling completed 16,143 12.08 3.87 
experience Total number of years in paid work 15,265 23.8 13.26 
S Proportion of female in respondent's occupation (3-digit 
ISCO codes) and respondent’s country 
 
15,827 
 
0.52 
 
0.27 
f Sex of employed respondents    
  Male 7,917 48.75%  
  Female 8,324 51.25%  
JSK Time that would be required for people with the right 
qualification to learn to do R’s jobs well, measured using 
an interval scale ranging from 1= less than a week, to 
8=more than 2 years  
 
 
 
16,255 
 
 
 
4.39 
 
 
 
1.25 
Absolute 
housework 
N of hours of housework provided by R on a typical 
weekday, measured as total number of hours of 
household housework divided by respondents’ share 
 
 
16,255 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
3.54 
Relative 
housework 
(Proportion of housework typically provided by R on a 
typical weekday)-(Proportion of housework typically 
provided by R’s partner on a typical weekday). It ranges 
from -1= R’s partner does all the housework to 1= the R 
does all the housework. 
 
 
 
 
15.892 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
Sex-role 
attitudes 
Index of (traditional) gender role attitudes. 21-interval 
scale ranging from 0=less traditional to 20=more 
traditional.  
 
 
16,255 
 
 
9.45 
 
 
3.06 
Personality 
traits 
Index of social ambition. It is a 6-interval scale ranging 
from -3=less to 3=more ambitious. 
 
16,255 
 
-0.41 
 
0.84 
Welfare 
Typology 
Grouping of countries according to Esping-Andersen 
(1990) welfare regimes plus post-communist Europe 
   
  Conservative (BE, LU, CH, ES and former 
West DE) 
 
6,990 
 
43.0% 
 
  Social Democratic (DK, SE, NO, FI) 3,993 24.6%  
  Liberal (UK) 829 5.1%  
  Post-Communist (CZ, PL, and former East 
DE) 
 
4,443 
 
27.3% 
 
 
 
Note.- (1) Values greater than 6.39 (i.e. 600 €/hour) have been recoded as missing.  
Source: European Social Survey, Selected Countries (2004).  
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Methodology 
 
Hypotheses are tested using a simple two-level linear framework that addresses the 
nested structure of the ESS data. This framework accounts for the existence of residual 
components at both the individual and the country level by splitting the regression 
intercept (β0j) into two separate components: the mean of the country intercepts (γ00) and 
a between-country residual variance parameter (u0j). This latter parameter is assumed to 
have a random distribution
 
u0j ~ N(0,σu2) and can be estimated either as a fixed or as a 
random coefficient (for a technical discussion see Halaby 2004). In our selected sample 
we have 13 countries containing an average of 363 married or cohabiting wage earners 
each. These sample sizes seem to favor random-intercept models over fixed-effects (see 
Snijders and Bosker 1999) and hence random-intercept regressions are presented below. 
Yet it must be noted that all substantive findings are robust to using fixed-effect 
estimates instead (results available on request). The parameters of the random-intercept 
models fitted to the ESS selected sample have been estimated by maximum likelihood 
method15. Hypotheses are tested using nested equations within a model-building 
framework as in Tam (1997) and Polavieja (2008).  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Table 2 (below) shows the results of fitting maximum-likelihood random-intercept 
regressions to our ESS selected sub-sample of married and cohabiting respondents. Note 
that housework effects are tested using the two alternative indicators described above: 
absolute number of hours of housework supplied by the respondent (equations 4a and 
5a) and proportion of domestic workload relative to respondent’s partner (equations 4b 
and 5b).  
 
Equation 1 is a standard Mincerian equation that yields a wage difference of 22% 
between men and women. Equation 2 adds occupational sex composition and this takes 
up some of the sex-difference estimated in model 1 - although not a very substantial part 
of it. The unstandardized beta coefficient for occupational sex-composition estimated in 
equation 2 is -0.078. Since yi is logged hourly wages, this amounts to a 8% wage 
difference per hour between individuals employed in fully male occupations and those 
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employed in fully female-ones, and this net of experience and education. Equation 3 
adds job-specialization, measured as time required to learn respondent’s job, and this 
absorbs a very substantial part of the effect of occupational sex-composition on 
earnings16. The sex-composition coefficient drops from -0.08 to -0.04 and becomes non-
significant (P>|z|=0.15). Note that job-specialization also reduces the sex-intercept 
coefficient, as well as the labour market experience and schooling coefficients. This 
finding is consistent with hypothesis 1 as it suggests that the observed sex-differences in 
job-allocation leading to sex-differences in pay reflect to a large extent differences in 
job-specific skill investments, which seems in line with previous results reported in the 
literature (see Tam 1997; Polavieja 2007; 2008).  
 
Equations 4a and 4b add our alternative housework supply measures to the earnings 
function. As expected, both absolute and relative measures of housework supply are 
negatively associated with hourly earnings and this net of human capital variables and 
job-specialization. Possible interactions between each of these indicators and 
respondents’ sex have been tested and rejected (results available on request). Note that 
accounting for housework also reduces the sex-intercept coefficient, thus indicating that 
some of the sex-differences in pay not explained by the previous equations could 
actually be due to sex-differences in domestic supply, a finding which seems also in line 
with previous research on the earning consequences of housework (see e.g., Bonke et al. 
2003; Hersch and Stratton 1997; Stratton 2001). In sum, these findings seem to suggest 
that housework supply is linked to both sex-differences in job-allocation, from which 
earning consequences could follow, and more directly to earnings, which is also 
consistent with the housework association hypothesis (H2/3).  
 
Models 5a and 5b add our final attitudinal controls. Three main findings are worth 
reporting. First, we can observe a significant negative association between traditional 
gender attitudes and earnings for women (yet not for men); secondly, we can also 
observe a significant positive association between the social ambition index and earnings 
(for both sexes17); and, thirdly, we can observe that, despite these attitudinal controls, 
both job-specialization and housework measures maintain their significant effects on 
earnings. This is a very important finding as it suggests that the observed associations 
between sex, occupational sex-composition, job-specialization and housework-supply 
occur irrespectively of respondents own sex-role attitudes and personal tastes - as 
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captured by the social ambition index. Hence hypothesis 4 seems also supported by the 
ESS data. 
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Table 2. Random-intercept regressions on the log of gross hourly wages, ESS (2004) (Segregation= S3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b  
Input variables 
b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. 
Female -.216 
(.014) 
**** -.192 
(.017) 
**** -.172 
(.017) 
**** -.154 
(.018) 
**** -.142  
(.020) 
**** (see below) (see below) 
Experience .014 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.014 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.012 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.012 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.012 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.013 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.013 
(.002) 
**** 
 
Experience2 -.0002 
(.00005) 
**** 
 
-.0002 
(.00005) 
**** -.0002  
(.00005) 
*** -.0002 
(.00005) 
*** -.0002 
(.00005)
*** -.0002 
(.00005)
**** -.0002 
(.00005) 
*** 
Years of Education .050 
(.002) 
**** .050 
(.002) 
**** .045 
(.002) 
**** .045 
(.002) 
**** .045 
(.002) 
**** .043 
(.002) 
**** .044 
(.002) 
**** 
S (P of female in R’s 
occupation) 
  -.078 
(.030) 
*** -.043  
(.030) 
n.s. -.036  
(.030) 
n.s. -.036  
(.030) 
n.s. -.031  
(.030) 
n.s. -.031  
(.030) 
n.s. 
JSK (T required to 
learn R’s job) 
    .050 
(.005) 
**** .0496 
(.005) 
**** .0495 
(.005) 
**** .0486 
(.005) 
**** .0485 
(.005) 
**** 
Housework (N of hours supplied 
by R) 
     -.0198 
(.006) 
****   -.0160 
(.006) 
***   
Relative housework 
(vis-à-vis partner) 
        -.046  
(.017) 
***   -.0384 
(.017) 
** 
Sex-role attitudes(ID)*sex(f)              
Female (ID=0)           -.037  
(.043) 
n.s. -.029  
(.043) 
n.s. 
ID (for men)           -.0009 
(.004) 
n.s. -.0016 
(.004) 
n.s. 
 ID*f (ID for women)          -.0153 
(.005) 
*** -.0150 
(.005) 
*** 
Social ambition index          .0176 
(.009) 
* .0182 
(.009) 
** 
Constant 1.93 **** 1.93 **** 1.75 **** 1.75 **** 1.71 **** 1.67  **** 1.64  **** 
N level-1 (N level-2) = 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 
sigma_u  .73*** .73*** .72*** .72*** .72*** .71*** .71*** 
sigma_e  .48**** .48**** .48**** .48**** .48**** .48*** .48**** 
**** significance ≤ 0.001; *** significance ≤ 0.01; ** significance ≤ 0.05; * significance ≤ 0.1 
Source: Calculated by the author from European Social Survey, Selected Countries (2004). 
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Welfare regime interactions  
 
Empirical findings seem therefore consistent with the idea that there are incentive 
structures leading to sphere specialization by sex which are independent of differences in 
preferences and tastes. Such incentive structures are expected to be affected by 
institutional variation. According to the institutional variation hypothesis (H5), the 
incentives for sphere specialization by sex, and hence the association between 
housework supply and earnings, should be less strong in welfare regimes that provide 
higher levels of defamilialization and decommodification.  
 
In order to test for institutional variation in the association between housework and 
earnings (H5), models 6a and 6b introduce an interaction between the welfare regime 
typology described above and each of our housework indicators. Since our model 
specification allows country intercepts to vary randomly, the parameters of these 
interactions can be interpreted as net of country-specific influences on average earnings. 
This seems the most sensible way of testing for welfare-state effects given the size of our 
working sample. The results of these tests are presented in table 3 (below). 
 
Equation 6a fits an interaction between welfare regimes and the total supply of 
housework provided by married or cohabiting employed respondents, controlling for all 
the parameters estimated in the previous model (model 5a in table 2) plus a further 
control for the level of wage dispersion in respondents’ industry at their region of 
residence. Model 6a shows that there is a significant and negative association between 
absolute supply of housework and earnings in conservative welfare regimes (BE, LU, 
ES, CH and former-West DE), which are the reference category in the regime interaction 
(βref.= -0.026, P>|z|=0.009). This means that in conservative societies 1 hour increase of 
housework supply “reduces” hourly wages by an average of 3% points. This statistical 
association between individuals’ absolute housework supply and their earnings does not 
appear to be significantly different in either liberal (i.e. UK) or in post-communist 
societies (PL, CZ and former-East DE), as shown by their respective interacted 
coefficients. Yet model 6a yields a statistically significant interaction effect for 
Scandinavian societies (DK, SE, NO and FI) and this even after controlling for wage 
dispersion at the industry level. The coefficient of this interaction term for social-
democratic societies captures how different the association between absolute housework 
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and earnings is for this regime type in comparison to the association found for the 
conservative cluster. Note that the interacted coefficient estimated by model 6a is βint.= 
0.027, P>|z|=0.04, which means that the absolute association between housework and 
earnings for this regime type would be approximately 0 and evidently non-significant: 
 
  βscandinavia = βref.- βint.= -0.026 + 0.027= 0.001≈ 0, P>|z|=0.90 
 
Model 6b tests for the welfare regime interaction using this time the relative measure of 
housework and finds that not only the social-democratic but also the post-communist 
regime appear as having a significantly different association between relative housework 
and earnings - i.e., different from the one observed for conservative societies, which is 
βref.= -0.089, P>|z|=0.000. The interacted term for the social-democratic regime is now 
βint.= 0.082, P>|z|=0.007 and hence the absolute effect of relative housework would be: 
 
βscandinavia = βref.- βint.= -0.089 + 0.082= 0.007≈ 0, P>|z|=0.79 
 
The interacted term for the post-communist regime is βint. = 0.098, P>|z|=0.008 and 
hence the absolute effect of relative housework supply would be: 
 
   βpost-comm.= βref.- βint.= -0.088 + 0.098= -0.009≈ 0, P>|z|=0.78  
 
In sum, we find that for individuals living in the Scandinavian cluster, the association 
between housework supply and earnings seems significantly weaker than the one found 
in the conservative and the liberal clusters and this regardless of how we measure 
housework. In fact no statistically significant association between housework and 
earnings seems to be found in social-democratic welfare regimes. Similar results are 
found for the post-communist cluster but only when we use the relative housework 
measure.  
 
The interactions tested seem thus consistent with the idea that high levels of 
defamilialization and decommodification, as those prevailing in Scandinavian countries, 
can affect the incentive structures leading to sex-differences in job allocation and pay by 
reducing the costs of job-specialization for women, by redistributing the risks of job-
disruption across the sexes and by enhancing women’s bargaining power within their 
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families. All these effects combined could be stronger than the possibly adverse 
consequences of generous parental leave also typical of Scandinavian societies. 
Together, they could help to erode the work-family nexus by reducing the pay-offs of a 
“traditional” division of labour between spouses.  
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Table 3. Random-intercept regressions on the log of gross hourly wages. Institutional 
interactions, ESS (2004) (segregation=S3) 
Model 6a Model 6b  
Input variables b Sig. b Sig. 
Experience 
 
.012 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.012 
(.002) 
**** 
 
Experience2 -.0002 
(.00005) 
*** 
 
-.0002 
(.00005) 
*** 
 
Years of education .043 
(.002) 
**** 
 
.043 
(.002) 
**** 
 
S (P female in R’s occupation) -.033 
(.030) 
n.s. -.033  
(.030) 
n.s. 
JSK (T required to learn R’s job) .049 
(.005) 
**** .048 
(.005) 
**** 
Societal Clusters* Housework (absolute and relative measures)    
 Societal Clusters (ref. Conservative)     
 Social Democratic  .075  
(.27) 
n.s. .121  
(.27) 
n.s. 
 Post-Communist  -1.29 
(.30) 
**** 
 
-1.28 
(.30) 
**** 
 
 Liberal  -.14 (.45) n.s. -.13 (.45) n.s. 
Personal Housework Supply (N of hours) effect for 
Conservative countries) 
-.026 
(.009) 
***   
Social Democratic*Personal Housework Supply .027  
(.013 ) 
** 
 
  
Post-Communist*Personal Housework Supply .004  
(.014) 
n.s. 
 
  
Liberal*Personal Housework Supply -.006 
(.019) 
n.s. 
 
  
Relative Housework (vis-à-vis spouse)  
(effect for Conservative countries) 
 -.0898 
(.024) 
**** 
 
Social Democratic*Relative Housework   .082 
(.031 ) 
*** 
 
Post-Communist*Relative Housework   .098 
(.037) 
*** 
 
Liberal*Relative Housework   .026  
(.05) 
n.s. 
 
ID(sex-role attitudes)*f(female):     
f -.052 
( .044) 
n.s. 
 
-.041 
( .045) 
n.s. 
 
ID -.002 
(.004) 
n.s. - .002 
( .004) 
n.s. 
if*ID -.013 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
- .014 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
Index of social ambition .019 
(.009) 
** 
 
.020 
(.009) 
** 
Wage compression at respondents’ industry-region .002 
(.0004) 
**** .002 
(.0004) 
**** 
constant 1.94 **** 1.89 **** 
N level-1 (N level-2) = 4,726 (13) 4,726 (13) 
 sigma_u  
.40**** .41**** 
sigma_e  
.47**** .47**** 
**** significance ≤ 0.001; *** significance ≤ 0.01; ** significance ≤ 0.05; * significance ≤ 0.1 
Source: Calculated by the author from European Social Survey, Selected Countries (2004). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
As in virtually all social research, there is a gap in this paper between the theoretical 
model proposed and the empirical tests performed. This gap is admittedly considerable 
because the model proposed is dynamic, as any causal model is, whereas the data used 
are cross-sectional and consequently preclude any serious analysis of the direction of 
causality. Yet, to the extent that the model proposed makes explicit recognition of 
reinforcing effects between housework and labour market returns, resolving the issues 
regarding the direction of causality might not be so crucial for the validation of its main 
empirical predictions. At the end of the day, we already know that housework supply can 
depress earnings, whilst high earnings can help women avoiding housework. 
Endogeneity is not news. What matters rather is identifying the multiple interrelations 
that might occur between the micro-level variables of interest under different 
institutional conditions. The linear regression approach used in this paper should not 
prevent us from interpreting the results in a rather more ‘systemic’ fashion.  
 
The argument proposed in this paper can therefore be better interpreted as one 
identifying the conditions for two different scenarios, each of which assumes 
multidirectional causality. The first scenario is one of “traditional” equilibrium, in which 
sex-differences in housework supply, job-allocation and pay reinforce each other. The 
second scenario could be described as the “egalitarian-trend” scenario, where such 
reinforcement effects are curtailed by governmental action. Both the conservative regime 
countries of our sample and the U.K. seem to be closer to the former scenario, whilst 
Scandinavian countries seem closer to the latter. Central and Eastern European post-
communist societies could display some elements of gender egalitarianism, but most 
probably as a legacy of the past. There are significant differences in both the degree of 
defamilialization and in the degree of decommodification across each of these regime 
types. The model proposed explains why such differences should be linked to these two 
alternative scenarios.  
 
A very important piece of evidence for the empirical validation of the model proposed is 
the finding that the effects of job-specialization and housework supply on earnings 
persist even after controlling for sex-differences in sex-role attitudes and personal tastes 
(perhaps even personality traits). This finding has been possible thanks to the unusually 
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rich set of attitudinal variables present at the ESS. It has been judged as crucial because 
it shows that people’s (job and housework) allocation choices do not depend solely on 
their own subjective values and tastes but on the opportunity structure they face. This 
implies that, without state intervention, the structure of incentives behind sex-differences 
in job-allocation, housework supply and earnings could persist even in the face of 
attitudinal change.  
 
The explanation proposed here can therefore do without the assumption that unequal 
outcomes must necessarily respond to differences in actors’ preferences and tastes. More 
to the point, overt forms of discrimination - what economists call discrimination by taste 
- are not required to explain sex-differences in job-allocation and pay in this model. All 
that is required is subjectively rational actors operating in a context of uncertainty and 
imperfect information. In such a context, it has been argued, actors can use what has 
been termed distributional inference as a means to inform their expectations. Statistical 
discrimination is a form of distributional inference. Hence with very few assumptions 
about actors’ behavior, this model can offer a sociological explanation of how macro-
level structures (as reflected in distributional outcomes) can affect micro-level actions 
even in the absence of discriminating employers and/or family-oriented women. This 
explanation can be defined as structural precisely because it addresses the inequality 
component that does not depend on preference heterogeneity. 
 
The statistical models presented rest on a number of assumptions that have been 
imposed by the very nature of the data and which should be relaxed in future research. 
Small-N limitations have forced us to pool men and women together and to assume 
constant effects across the sexes for all explanatory variables with the sole exception of 
gender-role attitudes. This is a necessary simplification in order to save degrees of 
freedom. Small sample sizes have also forced us to compute an occupational 
segregation estimate using 3-digit codes. Given the small sizes of the ESS country 
samples used, this indicator could still be affected by measurement error. Occupational 
sex-composition estimates should be improved in future research by drawing on the 
largest datasets available in each analyzed country18.  
 
The analytical approach adopted in this study has sought to net out institutional effects 
from country-specific sources of variation by using a two-level regression framework 
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with random-intercept country effects and welfare-regime interactions. Yet it must be 
noted that the use of welfare-type interactions to test for institutional effects has also 
been imposed by small sample size and it is admittedly far from ideal. Welfare-regime 
interactions can capture significant differences across welfare types but they tell us little 
about which particular institutional characteristic/s might be driving these differences. 
Controlling for wage dispersion at the industry level is only a very imperfect step in the 
direction of isolating institutional mechanisms. The challenge is therefore to design 
fine-grained empirical strategies that allow us to open up the welfare-state black-box 
and see what is inside. This paper has offered a list of institutionally-driven mechanisms 
that seem plausible in the light of the evidence presented but which certainly call for 
further validation in future research. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 According to Becker (1993[1964]:30-50), investments in skills that have an economic value outside the 
firm should be borne by employees themselves. Yet there is mounting evidence that employers are also 
very often willing to bear with the costs of training in such transferable skills (see e.g., Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998). New training models explain this finding by arguing that, 
in imperfect markets, the wage returns for workers of non-firm-specific training may be less than the 
productivity returns for employers, so that the latter might still find it profitable to invest in transferable 
skills (see e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 
2
 Training does not need to be explicit but take the form of learning-by-doing on the job. 
3
 Note that even if nominal earnings are higher in H at all levels of tenure, the ratio wages/effort will be 
higher in the early stages of L-type jobs because skill-investments require effort. Note also that if it is 
further assumed that women “use up” more effort than men in housework activities and hence dispose of 
less effort to put forth, the pay-offs of L-type jobs at early stages will be even greater for women (see 
below). Introducing effort clarifies the incentive properties of the different jobs and facilitates the 
connection between housework and labour market allocation choices.  
4
 This follows from Beker’s theory of the allocation of effort, which states that effort is in limited supply 
and positively correlated with productivity in the job. Hence housework supply reduces the available 
“stock” of effort which will lead to lower productivity and lower earnings (see Becker 1985). For an early 
critique see Bielby and Bielby (1988). 
5
 Becker (1981; 1985) argues that even minor differences in the marginal returns to housework and labour 
market activities between spouses will make full specialization the most efficient division of labour within 
families, where families are conceived as having on single utility function.  
6
 Economic bargaining models assume that each spouse has a personal threat point and a single-state 
utility that acts as a constraint on their relative bargaining positions. The spouse with the lower threat 
point has less bargaining power and, hence, ends up assuming a larger share of housework. In the 
economic literature, threat points have been defined on the basis of spouses’ respective chances of 
remarriage (see: Ermisch 2003, ch. 2; Lundberg and Pollack 1996) or on their respective labour marginal 
returns (see: Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981).  
7
 Scandinavian countries also provide long and generous parental leave. As explained above, parental 
leave policies might deter employers’ investments in job-specific skills and hence hinder women’s career 
progression (see e.g., Rønsen and Sundström 2002), from which earning consequences should follow 
(Mandel and Semyonov 2005). Yet when assessing the overall welfare effect of the Scandinavian model, 
one should consider not only the direct defamializing impact of public childcare but also the indirect 
defamializing effects of decommodification. Both effects combined are expected to offset the possibly 
negative consequences of generous parental leave. 
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8
 The existing comparative evidence shows indeed that Scandinavian societies display the most 
equalitarian distribution of housework amongst spouses (see e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002; Evertsson 
and Nermo 2004; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005).  
9
 This procedure reduces estimation bias due to small sample size but at the expense of losing some detail 
in the occupational indicator. 
10
 Note also that the question on job-learning time refers directly to respondent’s job net of general human 
capital requirements. It has been argued that this is an advantage over externally-imputed estimates of 
job-specialization as such estimates are based on researchers’ assessment of occupational-level 
information and cannot always separate the job-specific from the general human capital requirements of 
respondents’ occupation (see Polavieja 2008).  
11
 The ESS includes two other indicators that could, in principle, be relevant to job-specialization: 1) self-
assessed difficulty of getting a similar or better job with another employer, and 2) difficulty to employer of 
replacing the respondent (as assessed by the latter). Yet these two indicators correlate very poorly with 
each other, as well as with job-learning time, and they show an equally poor performance in wage 
equations. This raises serious doubts as to their actual validity as indicators of job-specialization. Given 
these problems, I use only job-learning time as a measure of job-specialization. This approach is in 
accordance with the literature (see Tam 1997). 
12
 For a review of socialization arguments see Polavieja (2008). 
13
 All the indicators that form this “ambition” scale are part of what Schwartz (2006) identifies as 
“mastery cultures”. Yet I do not follow a “cultural” interpretation of the scale but use it as a control for 
individual heterogeneity in values, orientations and traits possibly leading to differences in rewards within 
any given national/cultural context.  
14
 Mandel and Semyonov (2005) argue that the lower earning differentials between men and women 
found in highly developed welfare states are actually attributable to the more egalitarian welfare 
structures that characterizes these countries rather than to their family policies. Controlling for wage 
compression will therefore tend to isolate the defamilialization and decommodification mechanisms 
discussed above from the possible effects of wage equalization. Yet it must be recognized that wage 
compression could itself be interpreted as another welfare effect that further equalizes intra-household 
bargaining-power. Under this latter light, controls for wage compression could be interpreted as 
unnecessary.  
15
 To keep the analysis simple, selection bias is not treated in this paper. Selection bias should, however, 
be significantly reduced by the wealth of controls applied. In fact, using the Spanish sub-sample of the 
ESS, it has been found that the introduction of housework and sex-role attitudes in the earnings equation 
corrects for selection bias, making Heckman joint-estimation procedures redundant (see Polavieja 2008).  
16
 Tests not reported in table 3 show that, although attitudinal controls and housework indicators also 
produce a notable reduction in the sex-composition coefficient, job-specialization is the only variable that 
can absorb all its statistical impact on earnings.  
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17
 Interactions between the social ambition index and respondents’ sex have been tested and rejected. 
18
 This has not been possible at this stage of research as the statistical offices of several of the countries 
analyzed in this study only provide occupational information at a very high level of aggregation (typically 
2-ISCO digits), so that the benefits of using large national samples as the basis for calculation are 
currently offset by the costs of having very poor occupational information. It is hoped that forthcoming 
datasets such as the harmonized European Labour Force Survey can overcome this problem. 
